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bstract
The Latin Monetary Union was initiated in 1865 by France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland. We find that LMU membership or adoption of
gold standard is frequently associated with lower volatility of private bill yields, bond yields, inflation, and deviations from Purchasing Power
arity. However, neither standard induces convergence with LMU leader France or gold standard leader Great Britain. Bond yield spreads indicate
hat adoption of the gold standard is more credible than membership of the LMU. Italy is an outlier, perhaps due to errant fiscal and monetary
olicies. A comparison to data from the modern EMS/EMU confirms that the LMU was a weaker and less credible currency arrangement.
2011 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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. Introduction
The implications of common currency areas, pegged curren-
ies, and currency boards are important to economists, policy
akers, investors, and ordinary citizens. The European mone-
ary system (EMS) and recent adoption of the euro rest on the
dea that currency union will further economic growth, tem-
er volatility, and reduce transactions costs. Ongoing debates in
enmark and the U.K. indicate concerns about the loss of eco-
omic sovereignty and the potential transmission of unwanted
oreign economic shocks if the euro is adopted. A peg to the U.S.
ollar has persisted for twenty years in Hong Kong, and recently
he dollar has been adopted by Ecuador and El Salvador. On the
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ther hand, a dollar peg has been blamed for contributing to the
ecent catastrophic collapse of the currency, banking system,
nd economic output in Argentina.
It is difficult to predict the impact of adopting a common
r pegged currency. On the one hand, a pegged regime can
ncrease the volatility of domestic macroeconomic and financial
ndicators (Frenkel and Mussa, 1980). This is because foreign
conomic shocks can no longer be absorbed by exchange rate
uctuations and, therefore, are transmitted directly to domestic
rices, interest rates, and economic growth. Heightened domes-
ic volatility can be particularly pronounced if the credibility of
common currency or peg is questionable (Flood and Hodrick,
986). On the other hand, some studies (Fratianni and von
agen, 1990; Artis and Taylor, 1994) find that the volatility of
omestic prices, interest rates, money, and output is dampened
fter adoption of the European monetary system. This may result
rom more international trade and investment, less exchange
ate volatility, or adherence to the conditions for EMS entry.
ther empirical evidence finds that the volatility of domestic
acroeconomic indicators (Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Flood
nd Rose, 1995; Rose, 1995) and stock market returns (Bodart
nd Redding, 1999) do not depend on whether the exchange rate
egime is fixed or flexible.
Successful adoption of a common currency or peg implies a
egree of convergence between economies that share the same
urrency. If a fixed exchange rate increases trade and invest-
ent, economic conditions across member countries will tend
o converge. At a minimum, the lack of a flexible exchange rate
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strain the stock and flow of minor silver coins to a reasonable
amount based on each country’s population. However, Willis
(1901) notes that the Union “had simply provided for a uniform32 K.-H. Bae, W. Bailey / Review of D
o absorb shocks implies more commonalities across economies
hat share a currency or monetary system. In cases like the EMS,
acroeconomic convergence on a number of dimensions is man-
ated. Furthermore, arbitrage should drive interest rates and
ond yields closer together. Thus, we can predict that correlation
f economic indicators across countries will increase when they
hare a common currency or other joint monetary arrangement.
f course, the same issue of credibility that can induce height-
ned volatility in a currency arrangement can also reduce cross-
ountry correlations if credibility differs across member states.
here is some evidence from European securities markets that
eclining volatility (Bodart and Redding, 1999) and convergent
isk premiums (Hardouvelis et al., 2006, 2007; Bekaert et al.,
010) are associated with EMS and the adoption of the euro.
The purpose of our study is to examine the financial and
conomic record of the Latin Monetary Union, a 19th century
ttempt at forging a common monetary policy and virtually
ommon currency. We examine the volatility and correlation
f interest rates, bond yields, inflation, and trade across mem-
er and non-member states during the time when this agreement
as in force in one form or another. We use data from this era to
evelop fresh evidence on the implications of adopting (or, in this
ase, attempting to adopt) a common currency policy. The Latin
onetary Union is of particular interest because it originated in
estern Europe and, thus, is an historical predecessor of today’s
ommon European monetary arrangements. Our results indicate
hat the volatility of interest rates, bond yields, inflation, trade,
nd deviations from Purchasing Power Parity are typically lower
hen a country joins or follows the LMU, though this effect is
ore pronounced for countries adopting an alternative rigorous
onetary system, the gold standard. We also find no evidence
hat LMU membership increases the correlation of interest rates,
ond yields, and inflation with the key LMU member, France.
t is also the case that correlation with the key gold standard
ountry, Great Britain, does not increase under a gold standard.
urthermore, credibility (as measured with the spread of bond
ields over the British bond yield) under a gold standard is much
ore striking than with membership of the LMU. Throughout
ur results, it is clear that Italy’s volatile economic conditions
nd policies distinguish it from other countries, in spite of its
embership of the LMU since its inception. In contrast, some
omparative results from the modern EMS/EMU era suggest
hat EMS/EMU membership converges bond yields and inflation
ates to those of Germany, perhaps most prominently for Italy.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
rovides a detailed description and chronology of the develop-
ent of the LMU. Section 3 outlines our methodology and data.
ection 4 presents and discusses results. Section 5 presents some
omparable results on the modern European monetary system,
nd discusses the applicability of our LMU era results to under-
tanding modern currency systems. Section 6 is a summary and
onclusion.. The Latin Monetary Union
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, many countries
ound themselves with bimetallic monetary systems under which rpment Finance 1 (2011) 131–149
oth gold and silver coins could circulate. Furthermore “free
oinage” meant that anyone could bring metal to the mint to be
oined into standard gold or silver money. The weight, fineness,
nd denomination of coins defined a “mint ratio” for the value
f gold versus silver. If, for example, a silver one-franc coin
ontained 5 g of silver and a gold twenty-franc coin contained
ix 2/3 g of gold, the implied mint parity was 15–1.2 The system
as intended to adjust naturally to changes in the relative market
alue of the two metals. If, for example, silver became more
aluable, silver coins would be removed from circulation by
rbitrageurs while additional gold would be brought to the mint
or coinage and circulation. As more silver was sold in the bullion
arket while more gold disappeared into coin, the relative prices
f the two metals would revert back towards the mint ratio.
Real world events and frictions complicated the workings
f such a system. Starting in the late 1840s, large gold discov-
ries in California and Australia greatly increased the global
upply of gold and drove up the market price of silver rela-
ive to gold as is evident in Fig. 1. As a consequence, silver
oins were often removed from circulation and melted, yielding
dearth of small coins to facilitate commerce. Some coun-
ries responded by producing “subsidiary” silver coins, that
s, small silver coins whose metallic value was substantially
ess than the coin’s face value. Such coins were less likely
o be withdrawn for melting and, therefore, were available to
upport commerce. However, these coins led to other prob-
ems. When, for example, Switzerland reduced the purity of
er small silver coins to 80% on 31 January 1860, arbitrageurs
sed the new coins to purchase French and Belgian coins of
igher purity and remove them from circulation for melting.
rance consequently banned small Swiss silver from circula-
ion on 14 April 1864 and reduced the fineness of her own
mall silver coins to 83.5% on 24 May 1864. Italy’s neigh-
ors suffered a flood of Italian minor silver coins when Italy
educed the fineness of her small silver coins to 83.5% starting
4 August 1862. Larger and purer silver coins also caused prob-
ems between western European neighbors. When, for example,
elgium adopted the silver standard in 1850 and began to pro-
uce new 5 franc silver coins, they were immediately replaced
y arbitrageurs who bought the new coins with worn old French
franc coins of reduced weight, melted them, and pocketed the
ifference.
France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland agreed to form the
atin Monetary Union (LMU) at the conclusion of a confer-
nce on 23 December 1865 and to take effect on 1 August
866. Recognizing the potential for lowered transactions costs
nd increased price transparency, the treaty confirmed standard
izes for gold and silver coins of union members, guaranteed
he acceptability of each member’s coins in settling public and
rivate payments in all member states, and attempted to con-2 For example, the ratio was 16 for France and 15.5 for the U.S. during their
espective bimetallic periods.
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Fig. 1. Relative price of gold and silver at London. The plot shows monthly high and low prices for silver. Source is Pixley and Abell (1933). The critical mint ratio
of France, 15.5, established in 1803 implies a price of slightly less than 61 pence per ounce given the amount of fine gold that defined the British pound.
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fineness and weight of the coins of the different countries, but
ad not even prohibited issues of paper or dictated the amount
f coin which should be issued. The limitation of the coinage
f silver had been merely intended as a means of protecting the
embers of the union from one another’s over-issues.”
Less than a few months after ratification of the treaty, Italy
uspended the convertibility of her banknotes into metal coins
nd put into circulation huge numbers of small denomination
anknotes. Italy’s small silver coins, in turn, flowed into France,
elgium, and other neighboring economies. The Pontifical State,
he only remaining holdout from newly unified Italy, expressed
n interest in joining the LMU but reversed course in 1868 due
o limits on minting of minor silver coins. On 17 February 1870,
ontifical minor coins were banned from circulation in France,
articularly as it was found that the coins claimed to be of 83.5%
urity but were often only 83.167%. The flow of such coins
eased when the Pope’s remaining territories were incorporated
nto Italy on 20 September 1870. Greece’s admission to the LMU
as associated with a similar problem. To avoid a massive flood
f small Greek coins, Greece agreed that all coins would be pro-
uced at the Paris Mint and shipped directly to Greece. However,
mall Greek silver coins were found circulating in Paris within
eeks after the agreement was put in force. All these cases were
d
a
nssociated with fiscal deficits and rapid money supply growth in
he over-issuing countries.
Such problems persisted, and were aggravated by continu-
ng falls in the price of silver (Fig. 1). Some members acted to
estrict the supply of silver coins by suspending the right of “free
oinage” of silver. In November 1878, a revised treaty banned
he minting of new full weight five-franc coins and imposed
n Italy a timetable for redeeming her small silver coins and
mall banknotes. Negotiations resulted in a less harsh deal for
taly but by 30 July 1879 “free coinage” of silver was elimi-
ated. Continuing problems with silver led France, in March
884, to demand full redemption of outstanding silver coins
y their issuers, particularly if an issuing country planned to
eave the Union. Countries with large amounts of such silver
oins circulating in Europe switched tactics afterwards, with
taly and Belgium voicing support for a pure gold standard
n the hopes that they could negotiate favorable terms for the
etirement of their silver coins held in France, Switzerland, and
ther neighbors. A treaty revision in December 1885 speci-
ed terms for redemption. In the middle 1890s, Italy was still
emanding concessions on redemption and experiencing short-
ges of pocket change as her silver coins were exported to her
eighbors.
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Table 1
Currency regimes from early 19th century to outbreak of First World War (June 1914).
Switch from
bimetallism to gold
Switch from
bimetallism to silver
Switch from silver
to gold
Other events and notes Joined Latin
Monetary Union
France November 1873 Convertibility of paper money suspended
from 14 July 1870 to 13 December 1877
23 December 1865
31 January 1874
6 August 1876
Belgium 28 December 1850 December 1872 De facto bimetallism when French gold
coins permitted to circulate, 4 June 1861
23 December 1865
18 December 1873
31 January 1874
Italy 31 January 1874 Varied local monetary systems prior to 1861.
With Unification, adopted de facto gold
standard 24 August 1862. Convertibility of
paper money suspended from 1 May 1866 to
11 April 1884, 21 February 1894 to
December 1913.
23 December 1865
Switzerland December 1871 Varied local monetary systems prior to 1848.
On silver through 1860.
23 December 1865
31 January 1874
Germany Late 1871
12 July 1873
Netherlands 1850 31 October 1873
6 June 1875
December 1877
United Kingdom Fully on gold starting 1821
Austria-Hungary 1879 On paper standard from 1848 to 1858, 1866
to 1892, and other times.
2 August 1892
Denmark 27 May 1873
Finland 9 August 1877 9 August 1877
Greece On paper standard except for 1869–1877. 10 April 1867
1 January 1869
Portugal 29 July 1854 On paper 19 July 1891. Pegged to pound 22
May 1911
Russia 1876 Often on a paper standard.
January 1897
Spain 1868 On paper from 1883 on. 19 October 1869
Sweden 30 May 1873
Turkey 1881 Often on a paper standard.
Canada On gold starting 1858. Pegged to dollar 4
May 1910
India 26 June 1893
South Africa Pegged to British pound.
U.S.A. 12 February 1873 Convertibility of paper money suspended
1862–1878
1 January 1879
14 March 1900
In many cases, more than one date is indicated. We designate a primary event date (used for computing our regime dummy variables) with bold type. Some events,
such as suspension of free coinage of silver, constitute virtual adoption of gold, referred to as a “limping gold standard” or “étalon boiteux”. Other events constitute
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dirtual adoption of the LMU system. Dates of such episodes are indicated in itali
indleberger (1993), Bordo and Capie (1994), and Fratianni and Spinelli (1997
Table 1 summarizes the currency regimes in force during
he period we study. As the table indicates, it is often difficult
o distinguish shifts in policy as many gradual changes were
xperienced. In particular, there was often a gradual movement
owards a gold standard (stopping the free coinage of large sil-
er coins, stopping all production of such coins, removing them
rom circulation, de facto or de jure acceptance of foreign gold
oins into circulation), rather than a clear-cut change in stan-
ard. We can, however, characterize several time periods of
he Union’s history. From its inception in 1865 through about
s
L
murces include Willis (1901), Einaudi (2001), Global Financial Database (2001),
873, the Union may be thought of as bimetallic. Starting in
ate 1873, more measures to restrain silver money appear. For
xample, LMU members agreed to suspend free coinage of sil-
er as of 31 January 1874. Willis (1901) describes the period
tarting November 1878 as the “period of suspension” during
hich LMU members stopped producing large silver coins. He
escribes the period starting 1886 as the “period of compul-
ory redemption” during which more pressure was put on errant
MU members to redeem their subsidiary coins held by other
embers.
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Although the Union survived in one form or another until
925, it was not considered a success. Some member states typ-
cally ran budget deficits and attempted to “export inflation” to
thers in the form of large numbers of minor silver coins. Keep-
ng the Union together was often seen as little more than a ploy
o avoid the forced redemption of those coins if a member state
eft the Union or if the Union dissolved: the weaker states did
ot believe they could afford to retire their minor coins in gold
nd, thus, kept the Union alive. The strong, leading member of
he Union, France, felt a need to avoid pushing weaker neigh-
ors to the financial brink and, in effect, subsidized them. The
utbreak of the First World War in June 1914 led to the general
uspension of gold coinage and effectively ended what was left
f the Union.
Since the LMU can be thought of as Europe’s first broad com-
on currency arrangement, it is useful to briefly summarize the
evelopment of today’s European monetary system. In March
979, the European monetary system (EMS) and its exchange
ate mechanism (ERM) came into force. Under the ERM,
xchange rates were permitted to fluctuate in bands ranging
rom 2¼% to 15%, depending on the particular country. Con-
entional central bank tools were to be used to keep exchange
ates within the agreed bands but, with persistent differences in
nflation and other economic conditions across member states,
here were repeated adjustments to target exchange rates. On
5 September 1992, Britain and Italy officially exited the ERM,
inland, Norway, and Sweden exited unofficially, and rates were
ealigned for Spain, Portugal and Ireland. In August 1993, the
ands were widened for remaining members.
More recently, member states agreed to converge domestic
conomic conditions by adhering to limits on such variables
s government borrowing, inflation, and bond yields. On 31
ecember 1998, the Irrevocable Euro Conversion Rates were
ublished, defining fixed exchange rates for each member cur-
ency and the new euro unit of the European Monetary Union
EMU). Member states also agreed to yield their power to create
oney to the European Central Bank (ECB). At the start of 2002,
uro coins and notes went into circulation in member countries,
ormally replacing the individual currencies of member states.
. Research design
.1. Methodology
As described in more detail below, the biggest constraint on
ur research is the availability of data. In some cases, we have
ccess to annual data only while in others there is no recorded
nformation at all. Therefore, we confine our statistics to sim-
le unconditional variances and correlations within sub periods,
inear regressions including time period dummy variables, and
ests for statistically significant differences across sub periods.
We focus our tests on several questions implied by our pre-
ious discussion and by the nature of the LMU. A key aspect is
o benchmark the LMU against the gold standard. The classical
old standard was a rigorous monetary system demanding that
old coin or paper money freely convertible into gold be strictly
aintained (Bordo and MacDonald, 1997). In theory, the LMU
i
m
c
opment Finance 1 (2011) 131–149 135
as similarly demanding, requiring convergence to a common
tandard and limiting the emission of undervalued silver coins
r paper money. In practice, LMU members sometimes skirted
hese conditions, exited a metallic standard entirely, or even-
ually returned to gold. In comparing empirical results on the
MU to those on the gold standard, we seek to measure the
ignificance of the adoption of the LMU and its perceived and
ctual credibility relative to a gold standard. Put another way,
id membership of the LMU imply the same degree of monetary
tability and credibility as explicitly adopting the gold standard
irectly?
We begin by examining the volatility of financial and eco-
omic indicators across time periods of different monetary
egimes:
1. The volatility of interest rates, bond yields, inflation, and
rade is lower when a country is a member of the LMU.
2. The volatility of interest rates, bond yields, inflation, and
rade is lower when a country is on the gold standard.
H1 suggests that membership of the LMU contributes to eco-
omic stability and is associated with lower volatility, even if
ember countries violated the spirit of LMU or even adopted
aper money at points. H2 predicts that adoption of the gold
tandard can serve a similar purpose.
In a related manner, we test whether adoption of a particular
onetary system (LMU or gold) implies convergence to the
conomic indicators of the leading proponent of that system:
3. Interest rates, bond yields, inflation rates, and trade of
MU members (or others who mimic LMU standards) are more
ighly correlated with those of the dominant LMU member,
rance, when they are both LMU members.
4. Interest rates, bond yields, inflation rates, and trade of a
articular country are more highly correlated with those of the
.K. when the particular country is on the gold standard.
Again, we benchmark the significance of the LMU by com-
aring it to the significance, in terms of economic convergence,
f the gold standard as upheld by Great Britain throughout our
ample period.
Next, we transform our inflation and exchange rate data in a
seful manner for an additional volatility test:
5. Purchasing Power Parity deviations decline during periods
hen a country is (formally or informally) an LMU member.
6. Purchasing Power Parity deviations decline during periods
hen a country is on gold.
For those countries, time periods, and frequencies for which
e have inflation data, we compute the average PPP deviation
ithin sub periods and test whether the average deviation is
ignificantly different during the period a particular country was
n the LMU, or on gold. Again, the varying degrees to which
ember states followed the LMU suggest looking at individual
ountries. PPP deviations are computed against the French franc
r British pound.
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Finally, we follow previous authors (see, for example, Bordo
nd Rockoff, 1996) and study the spread of a country’s bond
ield over the British bond yield as a measure of credibility:
7. The spread of a country’s bond yield over gold standard
eader Great Britain declines when the country adopts the gold
tandard.
8. The spread of a country’s bond yield over gold standard
eader Great Britain declines when the country is a member of
he LMU.
.2. Data
The LMU was agreed to in December 1865. Our start-
ng point is 1822, by which time the U.K. had fully adopted
he gold standard. We terminate the sample at June 1914, the
ime of the outbreak of the First World War when more fun-
amental economic and military considerations were at work.
ur principal source of data is the Global Financial Database
www.globalfinancialdata.com/index.html), which is available
y subscription. We also employ a few series previously col-
ected by Bailey and Bhaopichitr (2004) and Bailey et al. (2003).
hroughout the tables of results, we organize the countries into
our sets: founding LMU members (France, Belgium, Italy,
witzerland), principal non-LMU European countries that typi-
ally maintained a gold standard (Germany, Netherlands, U.K.),
ther European countries (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Finland,
reece, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey), and non-
uropean countries (Canada, India, South Africa, U.S.A.).
Table 2 summarizes the data series that are available for the
ountries of interest identified in Table 1. The quality of data
aries widely across sample countries, frequencies, and types of
nformation. France has generally good monthly data for private
ill rates and bond yields, although there are large runs of miss-
ng bond yields, private bill yields begin only in 1860, and the
onsumer price index is annual. Among other LMU founders,
elgium has fewer available bond yields than France while Italy
nd Switzerland have little or no bond or interest rate informa-
ion. A later LMU entrant that experienced difficulties, Greece,
as only scraps of bond yield data. At the other extreme, Great
ritain has excellent coverage of all data series. The U.S. has
airly good data as well, but its usefulness is compromised since
he use of depreciated currency during and after the Civil War
akes the U.S. much less suitable than Britain as a benchmark
or other countries. Wherever possible, we splice related series
ogether to maximize the time series and cross section of avail-
ble data. For example, dollar exchange rates are translated to
ounds to fill in any gaps in pound exchange rates, Berlin pri-
ate bill yields replace the Hamburg yields that end in 1899, and
holesale price inflation stands in for any unavailable consumer
rice inflation.
Our empirical results suffer the potentially confounding
mpact of contemporaneous events. For example, the Franco
russian War (14 July 1870 to 10 May 1871) drove France to
nconvertible paper money and put a large war indemnity in
russia’s hands at war’s end. The “Panic of 1873” and other
rises affected economies around the globe. Regional tensions
t
f
bpment Finance 1 (2011) 131–149
nd wars involving Italy, Austria-Hungary, and other European
ountries were also at work during the period we study. Fur-
hermore, the ultimate ambiguity in this study is the degree to
hich the LMU was an ideal rather than an actual monetary
ystem. Adherence to LMU rules by LMU members (or those
tates paralleling LMU) was often uneven. This is clear from
ur discussion in Section 2. Italy and others sometimes vio-
ated the spirit of the Union by overproducing cheap silver coins
r small denomination paper money. Therefore, we must treat
ach country or pair of countries individually in estimating and
nterpreting empirical results.
To compare the behavior of economic and financial indicators
nder the LMU to their behavior in the modern European mon-
tary system, we also collected three-month interbank interest
ates, 10-year government bond yields, inflation, and industrial
roduction growth from Datastream for the 15 members of the
uropean Union. The data are monthly and span the period from
anuary 1979 to December 2000. The sample of 15 countries
ncludes four (Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and the U.K.) that,
s of the end of 2000, were not members of the new common
urrency, the euro.
. Results
.1. Volatility over LMU and gold standard time periods
Table 3 summarizes the difference-in-means tests for squared
alues of private bill yields, bond yields, inflation, and trade
cross LMU, gold standard, and other time periods. In Panel
, there is substantial, though less than perfect, evidence that
rance, Belgium, and most other countries that followed rela-
ively responsible policies experienced decreases in the volatility
f money market interest rates and bond yields during periods
pent on the gold standard, H2. On the other hand, there is only
ixed evidence that the most egregious violator of LMU rules
nd good monetary practices, Italy, experienced change in the
olatility of these indicators while on the gold standard. Across
ll countries, the evidence on inflation and trade is typically
eaker, perhaps because of the short series of only annual data
hat are available.
Table 3 also breaks the data in “LMU” and “non LMU” peri-
ds, in addition to “gold” and “not gold” periods as discussed
reviously. In Panel B, there are fewer countries with which to
tudy the “on LMU” slope dummy, and this is aggravated by lack
f data on some series for some time periods. The results indi-
ate less volatility in bond yields for core LMU members, France
nd Belgium, during periods when they are in the LMU, thus
upporting hypothesis H1. There is also evidence that joining or
ollowing the LMU reduced bond yield volatility for two coun-
ries, Greece and Spain, with a more volatile economic record.
gain, much weaker results for annual inflation and trade may
e the result of small time series of data. Thus, mere LMU mem-
ership may have reassured the bond markets that good policies
ere in place or would be adhered to soon. On the other hand,here is no evidence that LMU membership, as was the case
or adoption of a gold standard, lowered the volatility of Italian
ond yields.
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Table 2
Summary of data.
Monthly exchange rate
with pound
Monthly exchange
rate with U.S. dollar
Monthly government bond yield Monthly private bill
yield (3 months)
Annual Wholesale
Price Index
Annual Consumer
Price Index
Annual imports
and exports
France All All 7/1822 to 3/1833, 3/1844 to
5/1846, 10/1847 on [957]
8/1860 on [648] 1840 on [74] All
Belgium 1/1830 on [1015] 6/1832 to 1/1859, 1/1885 to
12/1897, 1/1911 on [518]
7/1848 on [793] 1835 on [79] 1846 on [68]
Italy Thru 12/1899 All 3/1863 on [616] 1861 on [53] 1861 on [53]
Switzerland All All
Germany H: thru 2/1873 H: thru 12/1872
7/1872 on 7/1822 to 3/1826, 1/1870
on [579]
H: 1/1854 to 12/1899
spliced to B: 1/1900
on [726]
All All
Netherlands All All 10/1831 to 6/1870, 4/1873 to
12/1873, 1/1875 to 3/1880,
8/1882 on [920]
7/1860 on [649] 1846 on [68]
United Kingdom All All All All All All
Austria-Hungary thru 12/1899 All 7/1860 on [649] 1831 on [83]
Denmark 1/1864 on [607] 7/1822 to 9/1858, 1/1878 on
[872]
All 1841 on [73]
Finland 4/1860 on [652] All
Greece 3/1863 to 5/1880, 2/1881 on
[608]
Portugal All All 11/1823 to 12/1902, 1/1904 on
[1075]
1865 on [49]
Russia thru 12/1899 All 9/1822 on [1102] All
Spain All All 8/1822 on [1103] All All
Sweden All 1860 on [54] 1830 on [84] 1832 on [82]
Turkey 1/1826 on [1063] 4/1855 on [711]
Canada 1/1858 on [679] 8/1855 on [707] All 1832 on [82]
India 7/1822 on [1105] All 1832 on [82]
South Africa 1/1844 on [835] 12/1860 on [643] 1826 on [88]
U.S.A. All 1/1849 to 12/1857, 1/1861 on
[750]
12/1835 on [944] All All All
This table summarizes the span of our data. The starting point is January 1822 and the ending point is June 1914 for monthly bond and bill data and 1914 for annual inflation and trade data, yielding maximum possible
observations of 1110 and 93 respectively. “All” indicates that the particular series spans the entire period. For Germany, “H” indicates Hamburg and “B” Berlin. Number in square brackets indicates approximate
number of observations for those series that are neither complete nor empty. A few irregular missing values also occur for some series, as is evident in the number of observations reported for subsequent tests.
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Table 3
Volatility over LMU, gold standard, and other time periods.
Private bill yields Bond yields Inflation Imports plus exports
Nobs Average square Nobs Average square Nobs Average square Nobs Average square
Panel A: comparing gold standard and non gold standard periods
France Not on gold 207 0.291 515 0.067 37 5.915 55 127.940
On gold 439 0.178 439 0.002 37 2.332 36 37.430
t-Test 2.110 2.600 1.960 2.110
Belgium Not on gold 292 0.257 319 0.012 37 33.131 26 174.310
On gold 499 0.176 196 0.002 42 23.196 41 151.090
t-Test 1.180 43.660 0.850 0.230
Italy Not on gold 491 0.082 42 40.478 42 63.790
On gold 124 0.009 11 8.258 10 90.010
t-Test 1.660 1.450 −0.650
Greece Not on gold 499 1.596
On gold 107 8.148
t-Test −6.150
Finland Not on gold 55 244.510
On gold 36 106.890
t-Test 1.840
Sweden Not on gold 43 19.709 41 209.590
On gold 41 18.251 40 80.220
t-Test 0.200 2.300
Denmark Not on gold 433 0.018 51 38.629 32 294.730
On gold 437 0.001 41 15.521 40 53.870
t-Test 5.450 2.340 2.510
Germany Not on gold 215 0.892 67 0.031 49 156.530
On gold 510 0.343 510 0.000 43 19.333
t-Test 4.480 1.760 3.190
Austria Not on gold 385 0.171 61 170.900
On gold 262 0.096 21 35.590
t-Test 2.670 0.960
India Not on gold 856 0.006 61 115.440
On gold 253 0.001 20 65.120
t-Test 3.850 1.210
Netherlands Not on gold 159 0.410 470 0.026 27 54.380
On gold 488 0.117 440 0.002 40 32.650
t-Test 5.380 3.140 1.400
Portugal Not on gold 592 0.391 20 49.800
On gold 482 0.680 28 66.500
t-Test −0.690 −0.800
U.S. Not on gold 768 3.459 576 0.011 78 38.293 78 274.820
On gold 172 0.308 172 0.001 14 7.301 13 59.250
t-Test 2.280 2.460 1.580 1.280
Panel B: comparing LMU and non LMU periods
France Not in LMU 63 0.384 371 0.087 25 6.556 43 151.680
In LMU 583 0.196 583 0.005 49 2.883 48 38.790
t-Test 2.250 2.370 1.900 2.730
Belgium Not in LMU 208 0.119 319 0.012 30 38.393 19 182.400
In LMU 583 0.236 196 0.002 49 21.394 48 151.270
t-Test −1.560 3.660 1.420 0.770
Italy Not in LMU 32 0.016 4 27.752 4 36.650
In LMU 583 0.070 49 34.283 48 71.520
t-Test −2.84 −0.190 −0.580
Greece Not in LMU 69 8.654
In LMU 537 1.995
t-Test 5.160
Spain Not in LMU 437 0.018 47 260.760
In LMU 433 0.001 44 114.560
t-Test 5.450 2.000
Finland Not in LMU 45 197.150
In LMU 36 81.406
t-Test 1.840
This table summarizes the difference-in-means tests for squared values of interest rates, bond yields, inflation, and trade across LMU, gold standard, and other time
periods. Interest rates are monthly first differences of short maturity private bill yields, bond yields are monthly first differences of government bond yields, inflation
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that the links tightened when a particular country adopted the
gold standard.K.-H. Bae, W. Bailey / Review of D
.2. Correlation with French and British indicators
Table 4 summarizes the results of regressions that relate inter-
st rates (Panel A), bond yields (Panel B), inflation rates (Panel
), and trade (Panel D) to the LMU leader, France (H3). Regres-
ions include slope dummy terms to identify changes in the
elationship when the particular country is on the gold standard
r in the LMU:
i,t,t+1 = a + βZFrance,t,t+1 + β (DLMU,i,t,t+1 × ZFrance,t,t+1)
+β(Dgold,i,t,t+1 × ZFrance,t,t+1) + εi,t,t+1 (1)
i,t,t+1 represents the change in economic or financial indicator
for country i from t to t + 1, ZFrance,t,t+1 represents the contem-
oraneous change in the indicator for France, DLMU,i,t,t+1 is a
ummy variable that takes the value one when country i follows
he LMU from t to t + 1, Dgold,i,t,t+1 and is a dummy variable that
akes the value one when both country i and France are on a gold
tandard. The dummy variables define slope dummy terms that
llow us to observe changes in the relationship over different
onetary regimes. The other symbols represent the estimated
ntercept, slopes, and errors.
In Panel A, there is evidence of strong correlation between
rivate bill yields of European states and those of France. This
uggests some degree of commonality or integration across
uropean money markets. However, many insignificant slopes
n the gold and LMU slope dummy terms indicate no evidence
hat adoption of gold or membership of the LMU induced con-
ergence towards French money market prices. Furthermore,
egative slopes (Belgium, Netherlands, Great Britain) suggest
ess convergence with France during common gold standard
eriods.
Panel B presents similar evidence for bond yields. The slope
oefficients on the French bond yield indicate strong commonal-
ties between French bond yields and those of other states, even
conomies like Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Russia that experi-
nced economic and monetary policy turmoil at several points
uring our sample period. However, estimated coefficients on
old and LMU slope dummy terms again indicate little con-
ergence to the pricing of France’s bonds with gold or LMU
embership. The negative slope for Greece on the LMU slope
ummy term suggests that Greek bond pricing become more
diosyncratic once Greece joined the LMU.
Panel C presents similar evidence on inflation rates as they
elate to French inflation. Again, there is evidence in the slope
oefficients of common factors across many of our sample coun-
ries. At the same time, Italy’s relatively low R2 are consistent
ith the chaotic Italian fiscal and monetary policies contribut-
ng to detaching Italian inflation from French trends during this
eriod.Panel D presents similar evidence on rates of growth of trade
imports plus exports) as they relate to corresponding rates for
rance. Given the lack of GDP or industrial production data
or our sample countries during this early time period, the trade
umbers may be thought of as proxies for real activity, in addition
s
P
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o being of interest in and of themselves.3 Again, there is evi-
ence in the slope coefficients of commonalities between France
nd many countries. At the same time, there is no evidence that
orrelation was heightened when the country and France were
oth members of the LMU or both on gold.
Table 5 summarizes the results of regressions that relate inter-
st rates (Panel A), bond yields (Panel B), inflation rates (Panel
), and trade (Panel D) to gold standard Great Britain. The
pecification is similar to that used in Table 4, that is, Eq. (1).
ur hypothesis, H4, is that the adoption of gold (rather than
he LMU) was critical in binding a particular country to the
conomic conditions of the standard-bearer of that monetary
ystem.
In Panel A, there is evidence that, except for the U.S., there
s a strong relationship between U.K. interest and those of
ther economies. Note, however, that the absence of data for
taly and other problematic non-LMU members like Russia and
urkey limits this conclusion. Furthermore, there is little evi-
ence among the estimated coefficients on slope dummy terms
hat adoption of the gold standard (or membership of the LMU)
ade any difference in converging interest rates to those of the
.K. Indeed, negative slopes for France and Germany suggest
ower correlation with gold standard U.K. during gold or LMU
eriods.
Panel B presents similar evidence on bond yields: there is
uch evidence of correlation with U.K. bond yields but little
vidence that the correlation tightened when a particular coun-
ry shared Britain’s gold standard. The positive slope for Greece
n the gold slope dummy indicates greater correlation with the
.K. when both are on gold while the negative slope for Greece
n the LMU slope dummy indicates less correlation, as do nega-
ive coefficients on the gold slope dummy for France, Denmark,
ndia, and the Netherlands.
Panel C mirrors what we report earlier for convergence on
rench indicators. There is generally strong correlation between
ational inflation rates and U.K. inflation, but no impact of mon-
tary regime slope dummy terms. Again, it is notable that the
orrelation is relatively low for Italy, suggesting much volatil-
ty and turmoil in the economic conditions and policies of this
MU member. Collectively, the evidence indicates that LMU
embership did not hasten convergence to the economic condi-
ions of the leading member. However, there is no evidence that
he gold standard had any more power to converge economic
onditions to those of the U.K.
Panel D roughly mirrors what was reported for correlations
ith France’s trade in Panel D of Table 4. There is much evidence
f strong links between the trade of our sample countries and
rade of gold standard leader Great Britain, but little evidence3 Bailey and Bhaopichitr (2004), for example, use the rate of change of the
um of imports and exports to proxy for economic activity in their study of
acific Rim capital markets and monetary regimes in the period from 1870 to
939.
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Table 4
Regressions relating interest rates, bond yields, inflation, and trade to those of France.
Nobs Constant Slope on France Slope on
France × gold
dummy
Slope on
France × LMU
dummy
Adjusted R2
Panel A: Private bill yields
Belgium 646 −0.002 −0.087 0.224 5.443 0.044
U.S. 644 −0.015 −0.321 0.175 1.743 0.005
Austria 646 −0.002 −0.105 0.178 5.710 0.048
Germany 646 0.002 0.092 0.508 9.355 0.120
Netherlands 646 −0.002 −0.097 0.181 5.022 0.038
U.K. 646 −0.002 −0.068 0.410 7.356 0.078
Belgium 646 −0.001 −0.064 0.411 6.647 −0.330 −4.013 0.067
U.S. 644 −0.015 −0.318 0.149 1.355 0.154 0.573 0.005
Austria 646 −0.002 −0.112 0.166 4.464 0.039 0.576 0.049
Germany 646 0.003 0.103 0.616 7.486 −0.191 −1.741 0.124
Netherlands 646 −0.001 −0.076 0.329 6.087 −0.262 −3.651 0.057
U.K. 646 −0.001 −0.045 0.650 7.780 −0.426 −3.830 0.098
Belgium 646 −0.002 −0.110 0.379 3.855 −0.188 −1.734 0.048
Panel B: bond yields
Belgium 366 −0.002 −0.500 0.048 2.619 0.019
Italy 615 −0.004 −0.413 1.446 10.071 0.142
Greece 606 0.010 0.149 5.304 5.457 0.047
Spain 953 0.012 0.258 0.304 1.215 0.002
Canada 706 −0.002 −0.782 0.033 0.772 0.001
Denmark 721 −0.001 −0.247 0.091 5.081 0.035
Germany 577 −0.001 −0.453 0.067 2.022 0.007
India 954 0.000 0.048 0.047 4.121 0.018
Netherlands 767 −0.001 −0.272 0.205 9.643 0.108
Portugal 925 −0.010 −0.420 0.203 1.599 0.003
South Africa 642 −0.001 −0.311 0.151 4.470 0.030
U.S. 748 −0.003 −0.984 0.054 1.437 0.003
Turkey 710 −0.004 −0.217 1.779 7.411 0.072
Russia 606 0.010 0.149 5.304 5.457 0.047
U.K. 954 0.000 −0.363 0.063 8.936 0.077
Belgium 366 −0.002 −0.484 0.047 2.555 0.071 0.419 0.019
Italy 615 −0.005 −0.496 1.509 10.033 −0.699 −1.393 0.145
Denmark 721 −0.001 −0.263 0.093 5.137 −0.095 −0.766 0.035
Germany 577 −0.001 −0.451 0.066 1.781 0.006 0.072 0.007
India 954 0.000 0.061 0.047 4.134 −0.051 −0.346 0.018
Netherlands 767 −0.001 −0.278 0.206 9.572 −0.037 −0.247 0.108
Portugal 925 −0.009 −0.368 0.171 1.338 2.025 1.994 0.007
U.S. 748 −0.003 −0.944 0.057 1.506 −0.126 −0.541 0.003
U.K. 954 0.000 −0.339 0.062 8.698 0.054 1.064 0.078
Belgium 366 −0.002 −0.484 0.047 2.555 0.071 0.419 0.019
Italy 615 −0.004 −0.407 0.911 0.968 0.548 0.575 0.142
Greece 606 0.008 0.129 11.695 5.356 −7.939 −3.262 0.064
Spain 953 0.013 0.271 0.229 0.884 1.194 1.161 0.003
Panel C: inﬂation
Belgium 74 −0.351 −0.608 1.068 3.754 0.164
Italy 53 0.462 0.562 −0.382 −0.785 0.012
Sweden 74 0.292 0.557 0.604 2.343 0.071
Denmark 74 0.034 0.067 0.992 3.997 0.182
Germany 74 0.735 0.721 1.603 3.192 0.124
U.S. 74 0.586 0.966 0.465 1.555 0.033
U.K. 74 −0.546 −0.942 1.202 4.214 0.198
Belgium 74 −0.360 −0.618 1.146 3.397 −0.271 −0.433 0.166
Italy 53 0.449 0.538 −0.343 −0.592 −0.144 −0.131 0.012
Sweden 74 0.278 0.529 0.734 2.412 −0.457 −0.811 0.079
Denmark 74 0.020 0.039 1.127 3.847 −0.472 −0.870 0.190
Germany 74 0.712 0.696 1.826 3.076 −0.781 −0.711 0.130
U.S. 74 0.595 0.968 0.480 1.489 −0.112 −0.132 0.033
U.K. 74 −0.563 −0.971 1.368 4.068 −0.583 −0.936 0.208
K.-H. Bae, W. Bailey / Review of Development Finance 1 (2011) 131–149 141
Table 4 (Continued)
Nobs Constant Slope on France Slope on
France × gold
dummy
Slope on
France × LMU
dummy
Adjusted R2
Belgium 74 −0.358 −0.619 1.289 3.337 −0.476 −0.848 0.172
Italy 53 0.624 0.754 −2.736 −1.411 2.492 1.253 0.042
Panel D: imports plus exports
Belgium 67 2.792 2.066 0.606 4.406 0.230
Italy 52 1.297 1.299 0.701 4.481 0.286
Finland 91 3.094 2.300 0.540 3.852 0.143
Spain 91 1.587 1.180 0.425 3.034 0.094
Canada 46 3.169 2.137 0.764 3.258 0.194
Sweden 81 2.776 2.265 0.518 4.032 0.171
Denmark 72 2.653 1.903 0.513 3.522 0.151
Austria 82 0.971 0.939 0.768 7.220 0.395
India 81 3.867 3.575 0.171 1.508 0.028
Netherlands 67 4.725 8.421 0.025 0.430 0.003
Portugal 48 1.500 1.332 0.299 1.655 0.056
South Africa 83 5.678 2.616 0.259 1.153 0.016
Russia 91 1.813 1.106 0.536 3.142 0.100
U.S. 91 2.987 1.762 0.213 1.206 0.016
U.K. 91 1.371 1.635 0.515 5.891 0.281
Belgium 67 2.627 1.928 0.546 3.628 0.311 0.964 0.241
Italy 52 0.821 0.819 0.838 4.999 −0.848 −1.952 0.338
Finland 91 2.978 2.200 0.493 3.281 0.319 0.881 0.150
Canada 46 3.114 2.086 0.504 1.161 0.359 0.714 0.204
Sweden 81 2.727 2.204 0.496 3.553 0.129 0.409 0.172
Denmark 72 2.632 1.862 0.504 3.142 0.046 0.134 0.151
Austria 82 1.103 1.054 0.797 7.169 −0.276 −0.902 0.401
India 81 3.643 3.312 0.136 1.156 0.359 1.080 0.042
Netherlands 67 4.720 8.281 0.023 0.360 0.010 0.073 0.003
Portugal 48 1.460 1.293 0.225 1.131 0.387 0.899 0.073
U.S. 91 2.859 1.668 0.186 1.015 0.357 0.605 0.020
U.K. 91 1.316 1.557 0.492 5.251 0.150 0.665 0.284
Belgium 67 2.557 1.888 0.502 3.202 0.388 1.349 0.251
Italy 52 1.402 1.390 0.354 0.819 0.387 0.861 0.297
Finland 91 2.978 2.200 0.493 3.281 0.319 0.881 0.150
Spain 91 1.489 1.103 0.363 2.340 0.303 0.944 0.103
Interest rates are first differences of short maturity private bill yields, bond yields are first differences of government bond yields, inflation is the log difference of
consumer or producer price indexes, and imports plus exports is the log difference of the sum of imports and exports in local currency. Maximum time period is 1822
to June 1914 with data availability indicated in Table 2. Some specifications include slope dummy terms to isolate periods when both the country and France were
following the LMU or the gold standard. t statistics are reported to the right of each estimated coefficient. In some cases, regressions with regime slope dummy terms
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herefore, do not span more than one regime.
.3. Adherence to Purchasing Power Parity during LMU
nd gold periods
Table 6 summarizes the difference-in-means tests for the
verage deviation from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and aver-
ge squared values of that deviation across LMU, gold standard,
nd other time periods. The PPP deviation is measured as the
ate of change of the franc or pound value of a particular country
inus the difference between the particular country’s inflation
nd franc or pound inflation.
The center column of the table indicates that, on average,
PP deviations were small and did not differ across monetary
ystems. However, the right-hand column of the table indicates
hat the volatility of PPP deviations was often significantly or
arginally significantly lower as an LMU member or on the
old standard. Interestingly, LMU membership seems more sig-
s
aards were too ambiguous to quantify, or the country’s data are incomplete and,
ificant than a gold standard in reducing fluctuations in PPP
eviations for key LMU member states France and Belgium.
nce again, Italy deviates from the behavior of other countries:
quared PPP deviations appear larger during the LMU period,
lthough the number of non LMU data points available for study
s extremely limited. The results confirm earlier findings and our
ypotheses H5 and H6: the choice of monetary regime appears
o be associated with the volatility of economic and financial
ndicators and, in particular, adherence to some sort of standard
ppears to reduce that volatility.
.4. Bond yields and the credibility of a monetary standardTable 7 reports the results of regressions of country bond
preads on monetary regime dummy variables and an aver-
ge bond spread. Each country’s bond spread equals the yield
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Table 5
Regressions relating interest rates, bond yields, inflation, and trade to those of Great Britain.
Nobs Constant Slope on U.K. Slope on
U.K. × gold
dummy
Slope on
U.K. × LMU
dummy
Adjusted R2
Panel A: private bill yields
France 646 0.000 −0.003 0.268 7.310 −0.153 −2.991 0.090
Belgium 791 −0.004 −0.243 0.130 3.825 0.018 0.386 0.045
U.S. 940 −0.013 −0.234 0.075 0.854 0.261 1.014 0.003
Austria 647 −0.002 −0.107 0.048 1.934 0.105 2.166 0.026
Germany 725 0.002 0.079 0.493 9.354 −0.313 −4.459 0.125
Netherlands 647 0.001 0.034 0.097 2.371 −0.055 −1.068 0.011
France 646 −0.001 −0.054 0.389 6.174 −0.092 −1.605 −0.183 −2.363 0.098
Belgium 791 −0.003 −0.208 0.047 1.169 −0.187 −2.673 0.287 3.879 0.063
Panel B: bond yields
France 954 −0.001 −0.222 1.231 8.936 0.077
Belgium 515 −0.002 −0.524 0.358 3.575 0.024
Italy 615 −0.006 −0.578 1.354 3.932 0.025
Greece 606 0.001 0.014 10.136 4.596 0.034
Spain 1102 −0.001 −0.030 4.981 4.935 0.022
Canada 706 −0.003 −0.815 0.360 3.709 0.019
Denmark 870 −0.001 −0.266 0.778 11.490 0.132
Germany 576 −0.001 −0.581 0.450 6.841 0.075
India 1109 0.000 −0.203 0.639 14.503 0.160
Netherlands 916 −0.002 −0.463 0.924 9.140 0.084
Portugal 1074 0.000 −0.012 1.787 3.324 0.010
South Africa 642 −0.001 −0.425 0.309 4.151 0.026
U.S. 748 −0.004 −1.048 −0.003 −0.029 0.000
Turkey 710 −0.006 −0.316 1.602 2.808 0.011
Russia 606 0.001 0.014 10.136 4.596 0.034
France 954 −0.001 −0.126 1.558 9.954 −1.368 −4.270 0.095
Belgium 515 −0.002 −0.528 0.368 3.285 −0.048 −0.192 0.024
Italy 615 −0.006 −0.600 1.467 3.852 −0.623 −0.698 0.025
Greece 606 0.008 0.120 7.222 3.124 26.510 3.800 0.056
Denmark 870 0.000 −0.160 0.994 13.063 −0.912 −5.828 0.165
Germany 576 −0.001 −0.581 0.874 9.139 −0.766 −5.956 0.129
India 1109 0.000 −0.016 0.728 15.385 −0.593 −4.852 0.177
Netherlands 916 −0.002 −0.401 1.218 9.935 −0.886 −4.164 0.101
Portugal 1074 0.000 −0.012 1.795 2.798 −0.028 −0.024 0.010
U.S. 748 −0.004 −1.047 −0.005 −0.043 0.007 0.033 0.000
France 954 −0.001 −0.138 1.582 9.747 −1.044 −1.594 −0.349 −0.569 0.095
Italy 615 −0.006 −0.593 1.094 0.779 −0.652 −0.725 0.403 0.276 0.026
Greece 606 0.009 0.143 32.376 5.329 30.622 4.418 −29.263 −4.466 0.087
Panel C: inﬂation
France 74 0.386 1.831 0.188 4.035 −0.079 −0.913 0.207
Belgium 79 0.055 0.111 0.549 4.918 0.026 0.130 0.327
Italy 53 0.399 0.504 0.422 1.952 −0.427 −1.116 0.071
Sweden 84 0.577 1.365 0.333 3.699 0.134 0.787 0.231
Germany 92 1.125 1.195 0.650 3.436 −0.189 −0.500 0.134
U.S. 92 0.485 0.799 0.235 2.240 0.088 0.144 0.056
France 74 0.377 1.779 0.171 3.371 −0.168 −1.210 0.105 0.822 0.215
Belgium 79 0.042 0.084 0.540 4.624 −0.086 −0.199 0.121 0.289 0.328
Italy 53 0.424 0.534 0.725 1.668 −0.326 −0.809 −0.403 −0.804 0.083
Panel D: imports plus exports
France 91 1.575 1.832 0.545 5.891 0.281
Belgium 67 2.428 1.694 0.708 3.938 0.193
Italy 52 2.105 1.785 0.345 1.729 0.056
Finland 91 3.867 2.736 0.320 2.103 0.047
Spain 91 0.763 0.629 0.725 5.548 0.257
Canada 46 2.417 1.645 1.035 3.921 0.259
Sweden 81 2.181 1.835 0.709 5.048 0.244
Denmark 72 2.162 1.529 0.676 3.799 0.171
Austria 82 1.983 1.617 0.548 3.790 0.152
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Table 5 (Continued)
Nobs Constant Slope on U.K. Slope on
U.K. × gold
dummy
Slope on
U.K. × LMU
dummy
Adjusted R2
India 81 3.891 3.527 0.167 1.281 0.020
Netherlands 67 4.637 7.997 0.051 0.704 0.008
Portugal 48 1.146 1.008 0.427 2.147 0.091
South Africa 83 4.934 2.284 0.514 2.025 0.048
Russia 91 1.535 0.964 0.663 3.868 0.144
U.S. 91 0.876 0.609 0.923 5.958 0.285
France 91 1.477 1.701 0.517 5.256 0.215 0.863 0.287
Belgium 67 2.421 1.673 0.700 3.389 0.028 0.077 0.193
Italy 52 1.786 1.509 0.471 2.205 −0.840 −1.524 0.099
Finland 91 3.399 2.460 0.185 1.181 1.023 2.584 0.115
Sweden 81 2.064 1.744 0.621 4.067 0.454 1.426 0.263
Denmark 72 2.108 1.482 0.613 3.035 0.249 0.666 0.176
Austria 82 2.021 1.610 0.555 3.676 −0.070 −0.164 0.153
India 81 3.633 3.225 0.130 0.970 0.419 1.092 0.035
Netherlands 67 4.633 7.919 0.046 0.545 0.021 0.140 0.008
Portugal 48 1.179 1.027 0.322 1.045 0.170 0.451 0.095
U.S. 91 0.846 0.579 0.919 5.776 0.085 0.141 0.285
France 91 1.463 1.673 0.515 5.115 0.171 0.766 0.285
Belgium 67 2.360 1.624 0.662 3.067 0.133 0.386 0.194
Italy 52 2.105 1.763 0.348 0.694 −0.003 −0.006 0.056
Finland 91 3.399 2.460 0.185 1.181 1.023 2.584 0.115
Spain 91 0.488 0.400 0.652 4.673 0.458 1.410 0.273
Interest rates are first differences of short maturity private bill yields, bond yields are first differences of government bond yields, inflation is the log difference of
consumer or producer price indexes, and imports plus exports is the log difference of the sum of imports and exports in local currency. Maximum time period is
1822 to June 1914 with data availability indicated in Table 2. Specifications include slope dummy terms to isolate periods when the country was following the LMU
or on the gold standard. t-Statistics are reported to the right of each coefficient estimate. In some cases, regressions with regime slope dummy terms could not be
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istimated because the country did not change standards, changes in standards w
o not span more than one regime. Great Britain was on the gold standard throu
n the country’s bond minus the yield on the comparable
ritish bond. The average bond spread is a cross sectional
verage of such spreads across all countries. It is intended
o pick up market-wide movements in bond spreads (Bordo
nd Rockoff, 1996). The two panels of Fig. 2 plot bond yield
pread series for selected sample countries. The size and vari-
bility of spreads is particularly evident for Italy, Greece, and
pain.
In Panel A of the table, credibility under a gold standard, H7,
s examined. Most countries display strongly statistically signif-
cant negative slopes for the gold regime dummy. This indicates
hat, on a gold standard, bond yields in these countries became
loser to yields on Great Britain’s debt. Once again, however,
taly stands out: after controlling for the average market-wide
pread, Italian yield spreads seem to increase when the country
s on gold, implying declining credibility.
Panel B tests for the credibility during membership of the
MU, H8. We employ a more complex set of dummy variables
o isolate periods when the particular country was a member of
he LMU but there was no concurrent gold standard. It appears
hat France’s bond spreads were lower under concurrent LMU
nd gold standards but higher while an LMU member but not on
old. This is sensible. The measure of “credibility under LMU”
ctually implies greater credibility for Italy on an “LMU plus
aper money” system. Again, the complex situation of Italy is
vident.
i
F
coo ambiguous to quantify, or the country’s data are incomplete and, therefore,
t this time period.
. Does history repeat itself?
A primary driving factor in the failure of the LMU was the
erformance of Italy’s government. Budget deficits and gov-
rnment borrowing were not kept under control while issuance
f subsidiary silver coin and small denomination paper money
mposed costs on other Union members. Similar problems arose
nder the pre Euro arrangements in Europe when the fiscal
eficits and money growth of weaker members were “exported”
o Germany and other stronger economies through the managed
xchange rate system that prevailed at the time.
Is this likely to happen again? Euro-area countries have no
ower to create additional money and, furthermore, they must
dhere to constraints on budget deficits and other macro indica-
ors. Thus, the powers that Italy used to undermine the LMU
o her own benefit are not available to Euro-area countries.
owever, the conditions under which a member state might
e “warned” or penalized for violating fiscal deficit strictures
emain an issue and it is conceivable that a member in trouble
ay put itself at risk of leaving or being ejected from the euro
rea.
There are precedents, such as the case of Argentina exiting
ts currency board, for hard currency standards being abandoned
n times of economic turmoil. Furthermore, fiscal problems in
rance and Germany were among the first events to threaten the
onvergence criteria established for euro-area membership.
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Table 6
Purchasing Power Parity deviations over LMU, gold standard, and other time periods.
Nobs Average PPP deviation Average squared PPP deviation
France Not on gold 37 −0.54 31.96
On gold 37 −0.40 16.75
t-Test −0.12 1.69
Belgium Not on gold 37 0.45 33.00
On gold 42 0.00 20.75
t-Test 0.38 1.51
Italy Not on gold 28 −0.21 79.94
On gold 10 −3.36 35.37
t-Test 1.33 1.70
Sweden Not on gold 43 0.10 39.99
On gold 41 −0.74 19.97
t-Test 0.71 2.09
Denmark Not on gold 9 0.52 16.70
On gold 41 −0.45 18.48
t-Test 0.62 −0.22
Germany Not on gold 49 −0.85 144.84
On gold 2 −3.49 27.69
t-Test 0.30 2.61
U.S. Not on gold 78 −0.09 49.79
On gold 14 −0.58 7.63
t-Test 0.25 5.10
France Not in LMU 25 −0.82 39.48
In LMU 49 −0.29 16.64
t-Test −0.38 1.97
Belgium Not in LMU 30 0.14 37.83
In LMU 49 0.25 19.55
t-Test −0.08 2.16
Italy Not in LMU 4 1.29 7.30
In LMU 34 −1.32 75.37
t-Test 1.29 −3.60
This table summarizes the difference-in-means tests for the average value of annual deviations from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and for squared values of that
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(eviation across LMU, gold standard, and other time periods. The PPP deviation
inus the difference between the particular country’s inflation and franc or p
ndicated in Table 2.
To look at the impact of the evolution of the European mone-
ary system and subsequent European Monetary Union, we relate
nterest rates, government bond yields, inflation rates, and indus-
rial production growth of 14 European Union states to those of
ore EMS/EMU member, Germany. The monthly data span the
eriod from January 1979 to December 2000, and the regressions
nclude slope dummy terms to identify the period of convergence
from the February 1992 signing of the Maastricht Treaty to the
onth before approval of the Euro Plan in May 1998) and the
eriod of monetary union (from May 1998 to the present). Note
hat, as of December 2000, four EU states, Denmark, Greece,
weden, and the United Kingdom, had not adopted the euro.
Table 8 presents the results in a format similar to
ables 4 and 5. In Panel A of Table 8, changes in three-month
nterbank rates are related to changes in three-month German
nterbank rates and slope dummy terms. There is evidence of
ignificant correlation between interbank interest rate changes
n Germany and in a few other euro members (Austria, Belgium,
rance, Netherlands) and one non-member (Sweden). There is
ittle evidence that this correlation tightens during specific peri-
c
Feasured as the rate of change of the franc or pound value of a particular country
inflation. Maximum time period is 1822 to June 1914 with data availability
ds in the development of the EMS/EMU, and some evidence
hat it weakens.
In Panel B of Table 8, changes in 10-year government bond
ates are related to changes in 10-year German government
ond yields. In contrast to the results on short term interest rates
n Panel A, the slope coefficient estimates indicate a strong
orrelation with German bond yields regardless of the state of
he EMS/EMU for most EU countries whether they adopt the
uro or not. Interestingly, some of the strongest correlations
xist for those economies that have not adopted the euro. Strong
ositive slopes on the (199202–199804) slope dummy term
or many economies indicates that the convergence to German
ond yields strengthened with the Maastricht Treaty and the
xpectation that EU states would converge their economic
nd financial conditions as a prelude to monetary union.
everal countries also display a strong positive slope on the
199805–200012) slope dummy term, indicating still stronger
onvergence with the formal approval of the Euro Plan.
A number of other interesting results are evident in the table.
irst, the Netherlands shows no significance on the slope dummy
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Table 7
Regressions to assess gold standard and LMU credibility using spreads of bond yields over British bond yields.
Nobs Constant Slope on gold dummy Slope on average bond yield spread Adjusted R2
Panel A: gold standard credibility
France 957 1.291 57.973 −0.901 −27.387 0.440
Belgium 518 1.460 81.930 −1.130 −39.207 0.749
Italy 616 2.864 34.466 −0.548 −2.960 0.014
Denmark 872 1.002 50.160 −0.135 −4.780 0.026
Germany 579 1.373 67.428 −0.548 −23.450 0.488
India 1110 0.922 77.591 −0.330 −13.260 0.137
Netherlands 920 1.122 70.070 −0.764 −31.879 0.525
Portugal 1075 3.505 44.309 −1.071 −5.851 0.031
U.S. 750 1.418 43.959 −1.205 −17.881 0.299
France 957 1.319 28.701 −0.917 −22.338 −0.006 −0.676 0.440
Belgium 518 1.131 21.976 −0.996 −29.279 0.132 6.778 0.769
Italy 616 0.241 3.311 0.774 8.031 0.883 43.657 0.760
Denmark 872 0.766 22.028 −0.007 −0.239 0.067 8.177 0.095
Germany 579 1.407 26.470 −0.571 −14.061 −0.007 −0.686 0.488
India 1110 0.740 33.158 −0.217 −8.138 0.053 9.540 0.203
Netherlands 920 0.840 26.177 −0.623 −23.319 0.088 10.010 0.572
Portugal 1075 3.452 24.119 −1.048 −5.508 0.016 0.448 0.031
U.S. 750 0.697 12.103 −0.726 −10.631 0.237 14.408 0.452
Nobs Constant Slope on LMU dummy Slope on dummy for
LMU plus gold
Slope on dummy for
LMU without gold
Slope on average bond
yield spread
Adjusted R2
Panel B: LMU credibility
France 957 1.211 37.602 −0.546 −13.235 0.155
Belgium 518 1.460 81.930 −1.130 −39.207 0.749
Italy 616 4.136 13.007 −1.461 −4.469 0.032
France 957 0.855 18.923 −0.446 −11.112 0.098 10.669 0.245
Belgium 518 1.131 21.976 −0.996 −29.279 0.132 6.778 0.769
Italy 616 1.295 7.293 −0.780 −4.614 0.823 41.275 0.744
France 957 1.330 29.593 −0.886 −21.923 0.355 6.742 −0.033 −3.224 0.466
Italy 616 1.113 6.588 −0.088 −0.492 −0.912 −5.688 0.876 44.307 0.772
This table reports estimates of regressions of the bond yield spread (country bond yield minus British bond yield) on gold standard and LMU membership dummy variables, plus the average bond yield spread across
all available countries. Maximum time period is 1822 to June 1914 with data availability indicated in Table 2. In some cases, regressions with regime slope dummy terms could not be estimated because the country
did not change standards, changes in standards were too ambiguous to quantify, or the country’s data are incomplete and, therefore, do not span more than one regime. As a comparison to the intercepts reported
here, the average spreads for British colonies that were continuously on gold were 0.97% for Canada and 1.21% for South Africa. For countries with poor data but tumultuous histories, average spreads were 13.62%
for Greece, 8.53% for Spain, 2.80% for Turkey, and 1.69% for Russia. The time series average of the cross sectional average spread for all countries is 2.50%. t-Statistics are reported to the right of each coefficient
estimate. In Panel B, the third regression specification is not estimated for Belgium due to insufficient data.
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aFig. 2. Monthly spread between
erms. This is consistent with the country’s continually close
racking of German economic and monetary conditions and poli-
ies. Second, bond yields of Italy and Spain are significantly
orrelated with those of Germany only during the post Maas-
richt convergence and formal euro periods. This is consistent
ith the volatile economic and monetary conditions in Italy
nd Spain vanishing as those countries agreed to converge to
he Maastricht criteria. In comparing the Netherlands to Italy
nd Spain, it is evident that adoption of a demanding monetary
egime is most significant for member states that previously suf-
ered from poor policies and volatile conditions. In comparing
his bond yield evidence from the modern EMS/EU to our earlier
ond and private bill evidence on the LMU, it is also evident that
he adoption of the LMU was not perceived as converging inter-
st rates to those of the core member, France, or the leading gold
tandard country, Great Britain. In contrast, EMS/EMU mem-
ership often draws bond yields closer to those of Germany,
articularly for those states that previously experienced rela-
ively unstable economic and monetary conditions. The contrast
g
iGreece
eign debt and U.K. bond yields.
etween Italy under the LMU and Italy in the EMS/EMU is
articularly dramatic.
Panel C of Table 8 presents regression results on the conver-
ence of EU member inflation to Germany’s inflation. As was
he case for bond yields in Panel B, there is strong evidence
hat inflation rates generally for a number of EU members are
trongly correlated with German inflation regardless of the time
eriod studied. The sample of countries for which this holds
ncludes both core EU members that adopted the euro and oth-
rs that did not. At the same time, the estimated coefficients on
he (199202–199804) slope dummy terms suggest that, for a few
tates, inflation become less attached to core German inflation
nder the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. How-
ver, this is largely associated with “fringe” EU states Denmark,
reat Britain, and Greece that did not subsequently join the euro
rea.Panel D of Table 8 presents regression results on the conver-
ence of EU member industrial production growth to Germany’s
ndustrial production growth. There is little evidence that
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Table 8
Regressions relating modern European interest rates, bond yields, inflation, and industrial production to Germany.
Nobs Constant Slope on Germany Slope on
Germany × (199202–199804)
dummy
Slope on
Germany × (199805–200012)
dummy
Adjusted R2
Panel A: interest rates
Non-Euro
Denmark 263 −2.917 −0.122 0.176 0.996 0.015 0.019 0.569 0.498 0.006
Greece 191 65.661 0.289 0.003 0.001 −4.885 −0.931 0.451 0.063 0.007
Sweden 248 22.099 0.886 0.602 3.327 −2.251 −3.012 −0.155 −0.142 0.063
U.K. 263 4.307 0.335 0.124 1.299 −0.039 −0.093 0.465 0.754 0.011
Euro
Austria 131 1.937 0.286 0.312 2.034 0.513 2.900 0.650 3.420 0.638
Belgium 263 5.232 0.450 0.281 3.260 −0.125 −0.329 0.674 1.212 0.052
Finland 167 1.114 0.043 0.210 0.724 0.667 1.289 0.769 1.127 0.047
France 263 17.111 1.241 0.205 2.001 −1.025 −2.270 0.876 1.325 0.040
Ireland 263 5.211 0.218 0.214 1.208 0.510 0.652 0.733 0.640 0.012
Italy 263 14.732 0.438 0.002 0.006 0.267 0.242 1.037 0.643 0.003
Netherlands 263 −7.350 −0.901 0.339 5.599 0.534 2.002 0.519 1.327 0.158
Portugal 215 35.898 0.653 0.901 1.261 −3.999 −2.686 0.406 0.198 0.035
Spain 263 6.470 0.327 −0.056 −0.384 −0.232 −0.358 1.139 1.200 0.006
Panel B: bond yields
Non-Euro
Denmark 264 −4.861 −0.566 0.421 3.447 0.624 2.356 0.434 1.008 0.108
Sweden 264 7.226 1.061 0.372 3.841 0.662 3.154 0.498 1.458 0.162
U.K. 264 −0.363 −0.047 0.577 5.297 0.446 1.889 0.250 0.652 0.168
Euro
Austria 264 0.886 0.303 0.236 5.682 0.550 6.101 0.659 4.495 0.388
Belgium 264 4.238 1.032 0.450 7.709 0.416 3.286 0.470 2.284 0.347
Finland 264 10.711 1.317 0.250 2.158 0.377 1.505 0.819 2.009 0.066
France 264 4.047 0.719 0.633 7.920 0.370 2.135 0.266 0.944 0.303
Ireland 264 1.249 0.160 0.783 7.048 0.096 0.400 0.194 0.496 0.209
Italy 264 7.607 0.977 0.120 1.082 1.092 4.555 0.739 1.893 0.123
Luxemburg 264 6.038 1.402 0.075 1.231 0.136 1.023 0.814 3.770 0.076
Netherlands 264 −1.355 −0.383 0.932 18.523 −0.033 −0.303 0.029 0.162 0.635
Portugal 264 7.405 0.578 0.064 0.349 0.443 1.122 0.274 0.426 −0.003
Spain 264 9.614 1.294 0.130 1.234 0.911 3.977 0.756 2.028 0.111
Panel C: inﬂation
Non-Euro
Denmark 264 59.446 6.216 0.239 2.432 −0.360 −2.055 0.086 0.261 0.225
Greece 264 107.355 3.701 0.384 1.288 −1.778 −3.348 −2.279 −2.288 0.157
Sweden 264 79.567 6.022 0.139 1.025 0.022 0.093 −0.294 −0.648 0.172
U.K. 264 51.643 4.131 0.474 3.686 −0.722 −3.155 −0.319 −0.743 0.187
Euro
Austria 264 25.714 2.945 0.361 4.022 0.356 2.229 0.092 0.305 0.170
Belgium 264 42.100 6.395 0.322 4.751 0.127 1.055 0.455 2.011 0.297
Finland 264 67.659 8.003 0.242 2.785 −0.132 −0.855 0.275 0.948 0.297
France 264 80.847 13.802 0.274 4.553 −0.188 −1.753 0.162 0.805 0.564
Ireland 264 79.845 3.319 0.759 3.066 −0.696 −1.581 −0.081 −0.099 0.113
Italy 264 111.625 14.545 0.353 4.473 −0.237 −1.686 0.155 0.589 0.584
Luxemburg 264 26.103 3.161 0.456 5.369 −0.271 −1.793 −0.462 −1.629 0.195
Netherlands 264 12.456 1.455 0.151 1.717 −0.165 −1.052 −0.261 −0.886 0.023
Portugal 264 163.437 9.710 0.192 1.108 −0.014 −0.045 0.273 0.472 0.336
Spain 264 88.743 8.878 0.291 2.829 −0.208 −1.135 0.203 0.590 0.341
Panel D: industrial production
Non-Euro
Denmark 251 −0.696 −0.226 0.103 0.170 2.159 1.683 −5.231 −2.377 0.039
Greece 263 −0.268 −0.371 0.135 0.907 −0.562 −1.749 0.078 0.141 0.013
Sweden 263 −0.465 −0.757 −0.030 −0.238 0.154 0.562 −0.732 −1.551 0.013
U.K. 263 −0.141 −0.589 0.102 2.072 −0.052 −0.486 −0.073 −0.398 0.019
Euro
Austria 263 −0.605 −0.337 −0.032 −0.087 1.672 2.092 −1.971 −1.431 0.029
Belgium 263 −0.042 −0.056 0.533 3.397 −0.679 −2.005 0.668 1.146 0.060
Finland 263 −0.232 −0.635 0.036 0.473 −0.032 −0.196 0.378 1.347 0.012
France 263 −0.246 −1.065 0.232 4.854 −0.186 −1.811 −0.191 −1.076 0.088
Ireland 251 1.082 0.168 −0.084 −0.066 −0.207 −0.077 −0.879 −0.191 0.000
Italy 263 −0.072 −0.160 0.074 0.797 −0.038 −0.192 0.455 1.320 0.013
Luxemburg 263 −0.221 −0.270 0.162 0.958 −0.487 −1.336 −0.157 −0.250 0.008
Netherlands 263 −0.296 −0.531 −0.074 −0.646 −0.023 −0.092 0.352 0.822 0.006
Portugal 263 0.267 0.138 0.444 1.110 −0.386 −0.446 −0.444 −0.299 0.005
Spain 263 −0.419 −0.096 0.078 0.086 −0.484 −0.249 −1.455 −0.435 0.001
Interest rates are first differences of three-month interbank rates, bond yields are first differences of 10-year government bond yields, inflation is the log difference
of consumer price indexes, and industrial production is the log difference. Time period is January 1979 to December 2000 and all data are monthly. Specifications
include slope dummy terms to isolate the period between the Maastricht Treaty (February 1992) and the approval of the Euro Plan (May 1998), and the period
t
i
hereafter. t-Statistics are reported to the right of each coefficient estimate. A trend te
nterest rates and inflation over the period studied. In Panel B, Greece is excluded durm (unreported) is included in all regressions to pick up the substantial drop in
e to insufficient data.
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Table 9
Regressions to assess EMS/EMU credibility using spreads of bond yields over German bond yields.
Nobs Constant Slope on Germany
× (199202–199804)
dummy
Slope on Germany
× (199805–200012)
dummy
Slope on average
bond yield spread
Adjusted R2
Non-Euro
Denmark 264 −0.010 −0.388 0.272 1.304 0.037 0.100 1.217 10.008 0.278
Greece 95 −0.145 −3.086 −0.884 −3.464 −0.050 −0.123 1.341 3.920 0.283
Sweden 264 0.012 0.619 0.255 1.530 0.020 0.068 1.065 10.978 0.317
U.K. 264 −0.004 −0.169 0.188 0.963 −0.048 −0.139 0.855 7.501 0.179
Euro
Austria 264 0.012 1.111 −0.064 −0.714 0.007 0.046 0.768 14.662 0.460
Belgium 264 0.008 0.685 0.015 0.138 0.023 0.126 0.723 11.774 0.350
Finland 264 0.012 0.477 −0.134 −0.640 0.226 0.615 1.124 9.234 0.253
France 264 0.007 0.431 0.170 1.255 0.015 0.065 0.810 10.285 0.290
Ireland 264 −0.008 −0.327 0.041 0.209 0.095 0.275 0.817 7.114 0.164
Italy 264 0.012 0.554 0.512 2.853 0.067 0.214 1.468 14.027 0.433
Luxemburg 264 0.013 0.887 −0.595 −4.682 0.023 0.102 0.942 12.724 0.435
Netherlands 264 −0.002 −0.164 −0.061 −0.644 −0.006 −0.038 0.222 4.043 0.064
Portugal 264 −0.008 −0.206 −0.163 −0.501 −0.431 −0.755 1.623 8.558 0.228
Spain 264 0.013 0.584 0.311 1.699 0.068 0.212 1.293 12.124 0.362
This table reports the estimates of regressions of the bond yield spread (country bond yield minus German bond yield) on EMS/EMU regime dummy variables,
plus the average bond yield spread across all available countries. Time period is January 1979 to December 2000 and all data are monthly. Specifications include
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employ more powerful and interesting statistical techniques.
Furthermore, money markets and bond markets may have been
less liquid or efficient in responding to information or changeslope dummy terms to isolate the period between the Maastricht Treaty (Febru
-Statistics are reported to the right of each coefficient estimate.
onthly industrial production across EMS/EMU members con-
erges to Germany’s industrial production growth. This matches
hat we found for our real activity proxy, the rate of growth
f trade, during the LMU era. In brief, the modern European
onetary system appears more different and, in particular, more
redible than the LMU on the bond yield and inflation dimen-
ions.
Table 9 uses the bond yield spreads to assess EMS/EMU
redibility in a manner similar to the assessment of the credibil-
ty of LMU and gold standards presented earlier in Table 7. In
ontrast to what we found for the LMU era, there is virtually no
vidence that the credibility of the modern European monetary
ystem varies with specific developments in the EMS/EMU. It
uggests a uniformly credible system throughout its life. Note
hat the brief sample of modern data that we have selected does
ot span the very recent global credit crisis and concerns about
efaults by Greece, Ireland, or other euro-area members.
. Summary and conclusions
We study financial and economic indicators from the era of
he Latin Monetary Union, an interesting nineteenth century cur-
ency system which may be thought of as a precursor of modern
uropean monetary and currency arrangements. The Latin Mon-
tary Union was adopted in 1865 by France, Belgium, Italy, and
witzerland, and by other countries either formally or infor-
ally in subsequent years. Our empirical results are based on an
xtensive, though incomplete, database of exchange rates, inter-
st rates, bond yields, inflation rates, and trade figures that span
period of about 90 years from the early 19th century to the
utbreak of the First World War.
We find that membership of the LMU or adoption of a gold
tandard is frequently associated with lower volatility of private r992) and the approval of the Euro Plan (May 1998), and the period thereafter.
ill yields, bond yields, inflation, and deviations from Purchas-
ng Power Parity. This result, however, does not extend to Italy.
e also find that LMU membership or gold standard does not
nduce convergence with the key LMU economy, France, or
he key gold standard economy, Great Britain. Thus, we have
entative evidence that gold money or LMU membership “mat-
ered” to financial and economic volatility but did not appear
o induce “convergence” with key economies. The weakness of
he LMU is confirmed by bond yield spread evidence suggesting
hat gold standard adoption was “credible” while LMU member-
hip was not. The evidence on Italy is strongly consistent with
he weak fiscal and monetary policies of the Italian government,
nd is a reminder that mere membership of a seemingly respon-
ible currency standard does not confer economic success or
espectability in the money and bond markets. In contrast, some
esults on modern European bond yields and inflation rates sug-
est that development and implementation of the EMS/EMU
as been effective in inducing convergence to the German econ-
my, most notably for Italy and Spain. Analysis of more recent
MU data is warranted given the recent concerns with the cred-
tworthiness of several EMU members. It may be the case that,
iven more recent evidence, the analogy between the LMU and
odern European monetary arrangements will be stronger.
We acknowledge limitations to our use of very old data from
he LMU period. The data series are not complete or, in many
ases, are available only annually. This limits our ability to
44 For example, Hallwood et al. (2000) apply a GARCH specification to detect
isk premiums for the U.S. dollar in the period 1890–1897.
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n monetary regime than modern markets.5 Thus, money market
nd bond yields may not reflect precisely the impact of LMU
vents on the economies of member states. In spite of this, our
esults are interesting and, in particular, highlight differences
etween the LMU and modern EMS/EMU, and contrasting role
f Italy across the two agreements.
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